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The Department Of Justice Merger
Guidelines: A Critique and
A Proposed Improvement
R. Preston McAfee*
and Michael A. Williams**
I. INTRODUCTION
Antitrust policy toward mergers has a significant impact on the
United States economy. Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act,' any pro-
posed merger or buyout involving assets in excess of $15,000,000 must
be reviewed by the federal government. This involves hundreds of
mergers every year (2533 in fiscal year 1987). Moreover, the very
existence of an antitrust policy probably deters many profitable
mergers that would likely be challenged. Antitrust policy affects bil-
lions of dollars worth of corporate assets and the organization of pro-
duction in many markets.2
Current United States antitrust policy towards mergers is based
largely on the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines (Guide-
* Ph.D., Purdue University, 1980 (economics); M.S., Purdue University, 1978 (ec-
onomics; mathematics); B.A., University of Florida, 1976 (economics); professor, eco-
nomics, University of Western Ontario; former consultant, Antitrust Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, Apr.-Sept. 1987.
** Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1982 (economics); M.A., University of Chicago,
1978 (economics); B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 1976 (economics); asso-
ciate, Analysis Group, Inc.; lecturer, University of California, Irvine; former economist,
Economic Analysis Group, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 1982-1988.
1. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90
Stat. 1383 (1976). See generally Eckbo & Wier, Antimerger Policy under the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act: A Re-examination of the Market Power Hypothesis, 28 J. L. & ECON.
119 (Apr. 1985).
2. Mergers considered by the government have included some interesting prod-
ucts. These include condoms (delicately known as "rubber products not elsewhere
classified"), zero gravity plumbing, Harlequin romances, temporary dental crowns,
space stations, synthetic sausage casings, aerosol nozzles, jet tire recapping, and Long
Island urologists. Conversations between Messrs. McAfree and Williams and various
Department of Justice economists (1988).
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lines).3 A critical examination of both the rationale and the standard
used by the Guidelines is appropriate in evaluating the welfare ef-
fects of horizontal mergers. After concluding that both the rationale
and the standard used by the Guidelines are flawed, this article pro-
poses an alternative rationale and standard. The proposed rationale
and standard are superior on both theoretical and empirical grounds.
Furthermore, the proposal satisfies the most stringent criterion of
all-practicality. Implementation of the proposed rationale and stan-
dard requires the same information required by the Guidelines.
The primary rationale in the Guidelines for challenging horizontal
mergers is that increases in market concentration make cartel forma-
tion and other forms of collusion more likely.4 For example, in dis-
cussing the ability of small or fringe firms to expand output in
response to a price increase, the Guidelines state: "[C]ollusion is less
likely to occur if small or fringe sellers in the market are able profit-
ably to increase output substantially in response to a 'small but sig-
nificant and nontransitory' increase in price and thus to undermine a
cartel."5 The Guidelines contain many more references to "cartels"
and "collusion."
The standard in the Guidelines for challenging horizontal mergers
is based on an evaluation of how a merger will likely affect market
concentration. The Guidelines measure market concentration by the
"Herfindahl index," which is simply the sum of the squared market
shares of all the firms in the market. The Guidelines state that a
horizontal merger is likely to be challenged if: (1) the post-merger
Herfindahl is between 1000 and 1800 and the change in the
Herfindahl caused by the merger is more than 100 or (2) the post-
merger Herfindahl is above 1800 and the change in the Herfindahl
caused by the merger is more than 50.6
This article'demonstrates that both the Guidelines' primary ration-
ale (the increased likelihood of cartel formation) and standard (an in-
crease of sufficient size in the Herfindahl index) for challenging
horizontal mergers lack empirical and theoretical support. In their
place, this article suggests a rationale and an associated standard that
have some empirical support and rigorous theoretical support. The
3. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 13,103, at 20,551 (1988) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
4. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, 13,103, at 20,560-61. The other rationale men-
tioned in the Guidelines for challenging horizontal mergers is the "leading firm pro-
viso." This proviso states that if the largest firm in the market has a market share of
at least 35%, then any merger involving the largest firm and a firm with at least a 1%
market share is likely to be challenged. See id. at 20,561.
5. Id. at 20,563.
6. Id. at 20,560-61. The Guidelines state, however, that even if a horizontal
merger meets this standard, the merger is unlikely to be challenged if, for example,
entry is easy. See id. at 20,562.
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first question, though, is whether any rationale and standard are nec-
essary, or whether all horizontal mergers should be allowed.7
II. WELFARE-REDUCING HORIZONTAL MERGERS
In general terms, the determinants of optimal antitrust policy to-
ward mergers are well understood. In markets where potential en-
trants are not disadvantaged relative to existing producers, mergers
generally have insignificant welfare effects. Indeed, with no sunk
costs and speedy entry, even a monopolist is forced to price at cost.8
Even with an entry lag, the welfare effects of mergers in markets
where entry is easy are probably negligible. Currently, the Guide-
lines reflect this observation in that mergers are not likely to be chal-
lenged when significant price rises would lead to entry within two
years.
In many markets, however, entrants are severely disadvantaged
relative to incumbents. For example, all of the world's bauxite is
owned by existing aluminum producers so that entry requires the
consent of existing firms.9 Similarly, an entrant into wallboard pro-
duction in the United States would either have to buy a low-grade
gypsum site, since the high-grade sites are owned by existing firms,
or produce at a distant location (e.g., Mexico) and suffer prohibitive
transportation costs.10 Patents may also serve to disadvantage en-
trants. Without the consent of the patent holder, an entrant's prod-
uct may be inferior to the product of existing firms. In addition,
there may be first-mover advantages, spatial location preemption,
and effective commitment by sunk capital investment.'1
7. See Thurow, Let's Abolish the Antitrust Laws, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1980, § F, at
2.
8. See generally W. BAUMOL, J. PANZAR, & R. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS &
THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982).
9. See Pindyck, Gains to Producers from the Cartelization of Exhaustible Re-
sources, 60 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 238, 239 (1978).
10. See, e.g., 1987-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,639, at 60,832 (1987).
11. A convincing example of an anticompetitive horizontal merger is the 1979
merger of Xidex Corporation with Kalvar Corporation. See [1979-1983 Transfer
Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,982, at 22,434-35 (1983). Xidex and Kalvar both
produced non-silver duplicate microfilm. Three months after the merger, in June
1979, Xidex closed Kalvar's only plant and fired all production personnel. As docu-
mented by the Federal Trade Commission [hereinafter FTC], Xidex and Kalvar were
active rivals prior to their merger. Xidex's 1969 entry into the production of non-silver
duplicate microfilm was met with a patent infringement lawsuit by Kalvar. The FTC
documented numerous instances where buyers used one of the two firm's prices to ob-
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III. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
Antitrust enforcement in the United States has displayed extreme
variability. Twenty years ago, the Supreme Court found that the
merger of Von's Grocery Company and Shopping Bag Food Stores,
which resulted in a 7.5% market share, violated section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act.12 Recently, approval was given for a bank merger resulting
in a sixty percent market share. From 1968 to 1982, the four-firm
concentration ratio (the share of the market held by the four largest
firms) was the primary standard with which the welfare effects of
mergers were evaluated.13 Due to its obvious flaws (a market with
four equal-sized firms can be expected to perform differently than a
market with only one firm), this measure was dropped in favor of the
Herfindahl index.
A. Market Definition
The evaluation of a proposed merger occurs in two stages. First,
relevant markets must be defined so that the merged firms' competi-
tors can be identified and the merger's effect on concentration as-
sessed. The Guidelines define a market as:
a product or group of products and a geographic area in which it is sold such
that a hypothetical, profit-maximizing firm, not subject to price regulation,
that was the only present and future seller of those products in that area
would impose a "small but significant and nontransitory" increase in price
above prevailing or likely future levels.
14
Thus, the Guidelines ask whether a monopoly over a particular prod-
uct in a particular area would maximize profits by raising the price
significantly. (Five percent is usually considered significant.) If the
answer is affirmative, then the product and geographic area consti-
tute a market.'5
tain a lower price from the rival. See id.; see also Complaint Counsel's Trial Brief,
FTC Doc. No. 9146 (1981).
The competitive effects of the Xidex/Kalvar merger have been extensively studied.
See Barton & Sherman, The Price & Profit Fffects of Horizontal Merger: A Case
Study, 33 J. INDUS. ECON. 165 (1984). Barton and Sherman estimate that Xidex's
supra-competitive profits in fiscal years 1980 and 1981 from its purchase of Kalvar
were $7,869,000. Id. at 174, 176. Given that the purchase price of Kalvar was $6,029,892,
Xidex's decision to purchase Kalvar and then close its only plant and fire all produc-
tion personnel was clearly profitable. See id. at 170 n.12. Xidex's decision to close
Kalvar's only plant is also evidence that the merger did not lead to any efficiency
gains. Thus, no Williamsonian efficiency trade-off appears present in the merger. See
generally Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 68
AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982) (acquisition by one corporation of stock of another); see
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
13. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 13,101, at 20,523 (1988).
14. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 20,556.
15. Antitrust enforcement distinguishes between the economic notion of a market
and the antitrust notion of a market. E.g., A. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS:
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This market definition has the interesting characteristic of relating
the elasticity of demand to what constitutes a market: products with
very elastic demand cannot constitute a market. In many instances,
this is quite sensible, since the price of close substitutes serves as a
limit on price increases arising out of a merger. However, the elastic-
ity of demand matters more generally than is expressed through
market definition. The demand elasticity, of course, affects the size
of the welfare loss for a given quantity decrease. 16 Therefore, any co-
herent antitrust standard for evaluating horizontal mergers must
take into account the effects of the elasticity of demand on welfare.
B. The Guidelines' Evaluation of the Welfare Effects
of Horizontal Mergers
The second stage of a merger evaluation involves estimating the ef-
fect of the increased concentration on market performance. The
Guidelines measure market concentration by the Herfindahl index.
As described above in part I, the Guidelines state that a horizontal
merger is likely to be challenged if: (1) the post-merger Herfindahl
is between 1000 and 1800 and the change in the Herfindahl caused by
the merger is more than 100 or (2) the post-merger Herfindahl is
above 1800 and the change in the Herfindahl caused by the merger is
more than 50.17
The Guidelines then ask whether there are market factors that
cause the estimated concentration to understate or overstate the
merger's likely competitive significance. The factors include
(1) changing market conditions, e.g., new technologies, (2) the finan-
cial condition of the merging firms, and (3) entry. Next, the Guide-
lines examine a host of other factors "as they relate to the ease and
profitability of collusion. 1 8 An example of an "other factor" consid-
ered by the Guidelines is the homogeneity of the relevant product:
"In a market with a homogeneous and undifferentiated product, a
cartel need only establish a single price--a circumstance that facili-
AN INTRODUCTORY VOLUME (Porcupine Phil. Press ed. 1982). The economic notion
concerns uniformity of prices, allowing for transportation costs for a commodity. With
such a notion, market structure is irrelevant; thus, the economic notion is inappropri-
ate for antitrust purposes. The antitrust definition is motivated by the desire to dis-
cern anticompetitive mergers. See Werden, Market Delineation & the Justice
Department's Merger Guidelines, 1983 DUKE L.J. 514 (1983).
16. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE & ECONOMIC PERFORM-
ANCE 459-64 (2d ed. 1980).
17. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 20,560-61.
18. Id. at 20,562.
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tates reaching consensus and detecting deviation." 19
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE GUIDELINES' RATIONALE FOR
CHALLENGING HORIZONTAL MERGERS
The rationale under which the Guidelines challenge horizontal
mergers lacks both empirical and theoretical support. The rationale
in the Guidelines for challenging horizontal mergers is founded on a
mistaken notion of what constitutes the primary competitive problem
caused by horizontal mergers. The Guidelines view the primary com-
petitive problem of horizontal mergers as arising from an increased
likelihood of collusion. The empirical evidence suggests, however,
that the large, publicly traded firms whose mergers are reviewed by
antitrust authorities rarely collude. 20
Rather, the empirical evidence demonstrates that collusion occurs
primarily among small, privately held firms in a small number of in-
dustries.21 For example, the Department of Justice filed 279 criminal
price-fixing cases involving 423 firms in the period October 1983 to
August 1987.22 Less than one percent of these firms had ever filed
notice with the Securities and Exchange Commission to make a pub-
lic stock offering, and fully three-fourths of the price-fixing cases oc-
curred in just six SIC industries.23 Furthermore, in ninty-three
percent of the SIC industries in which the Department of Justice
conducted an investigation of a merger in the period 1982-1987, there
were no criminal price-fixing cases in that same period.
These facts are not surprising. As discussed by Joyce, economic
theory demonstrates that managers in large, publicly traded firms
have little to gain and much to lose from engaging in price-fixing
agreements.2 4 Conversely, the owners of small, privately held firms
often have much to gain and little to lose from engaging in price-fix-
ing agreements:
Two important criteria distinquish large corporations, where currently the in-
cidence of overt price-fixing and bid-rigging is low, from the smaller firms
that are typical defendants in an antitrust criminal violation. First, the gain to
the decision maker in the smaller firm who decides to collude with rivals is
usually more direct and amounts to a larger fraction of the profits from the
collusion than the gain to the counterpart decision maker in the large corpo-
19. Id.
20. See Joyce, The Fffect of Firm Organizational Structure on Price-Fixing Deter-
rence, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS GROUP, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, No. 87-9, DISCUSSION PA-
PER (1987).
21. See id.
22. See id at 19-20 & Table 1.
23. The six SIC industries and their percent of the 279 total criminal price-fixing
cases are: (1) highway and street construction (33%); (2) electrical contracting (24%);
(3) furniture wholesaling (5%); (4) water and sewer construction (5%); (5) motion pic-
ture theaters (5%); and (6) refuse systems (3%). Id. at 19-20.
24. Id. at 13.
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ration. In general, compensation is related to but not strictly dependent upon
the profits the individual earns for the firm, and while the individual price-
fixer and bid-rigger in the smaller firm frequently owns a substantial share of
the firm, the decision maker in large corporations is likely to be a minor
shareholder at best. Second, and importantly, small firms that are guilty of
price-fixing often have few assets available for recovery by victims of the col-
lusion. Where assets available to victims are small in value, the price-fixer
can be nearly immune to treble damage actions which constitute a major de-
terrent to large corporations (footnote omitted). 2 5
Many antitrust authorities mistakenly believe that the primary
concern caused by horizontal mergers is an increased likelihood of
cartel formation.26 For example, Jonathan Rose, in his critique of
the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) Guidelines,
stated:
At a philosophical or theoretical level, the NAAG guidelines represent a curi-
ous mixture of new learning-cartel theory, old learning-structural oligopoly
theory-and nonlearning-antitrust law as a mechanism to prevent wealth
transfers. At several points, the NAAG Guidelines reflect the Chicago School
theory that the prime concern with concentration is its contribution to in-
creasing the likelihood of horizontal merger collusive activity [citations omit-
ted]. This economic rationale underlies both the 1982 and 1984 Department of
Justice Merger Guidelines. This approach to horizontal mergers replaces the
underlying rationale of the 1968 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines,
which reflected the traditional structural approach to oligopoly [citations
omitted]. Although the NAAG Guidelines reflect modern cartel theory, they
also from time to time seem to incorporate structural oligopoly theory [cita-
tions omitted]. 2 7
V. PROBLEMS WITH THE GUIDELINES' STANDARD FOR CHALLENGING
HORIZONTAL MERGERS
The standard under which the Guidelines challenge horizontal
mergers lacks both empirical and theoretical support, which is not
surprising given the totally ad hoc use of the Herfindahl numbers in
the Guidelines. There does not exist any empirical evidence that sup-
ports these Herfindahl numbers. A recent test of the numbers in the
Guidelines found no evidence that firms' profits increase significantly
when the Herfindahl index crosses either the 1000 level or the 1800
level.28 The study concluded that "there is nothing magical about the
values chosen by the Department of Justice in establishing its merger
25. See id. at 8.
26. See, e.g., R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 440-41 (2d ed. 1981.).
27. Rose, State Enforcement Under the New NAAG Guidelines: A Two Level Ap-
proach, in PLI COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, No. 581, 27TH ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTI-
TRUST SEMINAR: MERGERS, MARKETS, & JOINT VENTURES 562-63 (Dec. 1987-Jan. 1988).
28. See Uri & Coate, The Department of Justice Merger Guidelines: The Search
for Empirical Support, 7 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 113 (1987).
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guidelines. The decision is purely subjective."29
In addition to their lack of empirical support, the Herfindahl num-
bers in the Guidelines suffer from a singular lack of theoretical sup-
port. As a recent study of horizontal mergers and antitrust policy
concluded:
The Merger Guidelines, while surely more sophisticated than what they re-
placed, are ad hoc in their use of the level and predicted change in the concen-
tration index to judge the likely anticompetitive effects of a merger.
In particular, the rule used to compute a merger's effect on the Herfindahl
index is logically flawed. This rule takes the initial market shares of the
merging firms, sl and s2, and assumes that the new entity's [post-merger]
market share will be sl + s2, so that [the Herfindahl index] will rise by ...
2sls2. This calculation has no basis in either the positive or the normative
theory of oligopoly. If indeed all firms maintain their outputs at the pre-
merger level, then the merger will have no effect on either consumers or non-
participant firms in the industry, so will be socially desirable if and only if it is
privately profitable. If, as is more likely, there are output responses to the
merger, then the assumptions behind the 2s1s2 formula are invalid.3 0
Another problem with the theoretical basis of the Guidelines' stan-
dard for challenging horizontal mergers is that the standard does not
even take into account the demand elasticity in the relevant market.
But, as is well known, the size of any welfare losses caused by hori-
zontal mergers is a direct function of the demand elasticity.31
VI. CHALLENGING HORIZONTAL MERGERS WITH A RATIONALE
BASED ON NONCOOPERATIVE FIRM BEHAVIOR
Recent empirical work has shown the existence in several indus-
tries of a statistically significant relationship between the price in a
market and either the number of sellers or the concentration of sell-
ers. For example, studies of the airline industry have consistently
found that the lower the number of competing carriers (or the higher
their concentration), the higher are airline prices.32 Importantly,
however, there has been no evidence that collusion has affected
prices in any airline market. The empirical finding that the lower
the number of carriers, the higher are airline prices is simply the
equilibrium nature of competition in airline markets. Such equilibria
are called "noncooperative" equilibria because the competitors did
not make binding cooperative, that is, collusive, agreements.
29. Id. at 119.
30. Farrell & Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis (Preliminary
Draft) 1-2 (1988) (unpublished manuscript). See generally McAfee & Williams, Hori-
zontal Mergers & Antitrust Policy, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS GROUP, U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, No. 88-7, DISCUSSION PAPER (1988).
31. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, supra note 16.
32. See, e.g., Williams, Joskow, Johnson, & Hurdle, Explaining & Predicting Air-
line Yields With Non-parametric Regression Trees, 24 ECON. LETTERS 99 (1987); see
also Graham, Kaplan, & Sibley, Efficiency & Competition in the Airline Industry, 14
BELL J. ECON. 118 (1983).
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Airline markets and other large, commercial markets are usually
highly complex. An empirical test of oligopoly theory that uses data
from such markets faces the daunting task of trying to hold constant
the many variables affecting the observed market prices. Because of
the difficulty of obtaining accurate data that can be used to hold con-
stant these variables, economists have begun to test oligopoly theory
with data taken from experiments with human subjects who compete
in controlled markets.33
Experimental tests of oligopolistic markets provide support for
noncooperative equilibria. For example, one group of commentators
has found that as the number of firms (each firm represented by one
player) increased from two to four, the market price fell from some-
what above the noncooperative level (but below the collusive level)
to almost exactly the noncooperative level.34 Fouraker and Siegel
found that in markets with either two or three firms (again, each
firm represented by one player) the best predictor of the market
price was the noncooperative equilibrium known as the "Cournot"
equilibrium. 35 Friedman and Hoggart found that when (1) the firms
do not have perfect knowledge of each others' costs functions or
(2) the firms are not all the same size, then "[iun the duopoly mar-
kets, significant (but less than perfect) cooperation occurs but, with
an increase in the number of firms, it vanishes almost completely and
the Cournot model is very accurate by comparison." 36
VII. EVALUATING THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF HORIZONTAL MERGERS
WITH A STANDARD BASED ON NONCOOPERATIVE FIRM
BEHAVIOR
The fundamental model of noncooperative firm behavior is the
Cournot model. In the Cournot model, each firm chooses the rate of
output that maximizes its profits given the rates of output chosen by
rival firms in the market. The Cournot model predicts that as the
33. See F. Dolbear, L. Lave, G. Bowman, A. Lieberman, E. Prescott, F. Rueter, &
R. Shearman, Collusion in Oligopoly: An Experiment on the Effect of Numbers & In-
formation, 82 Q.J. ECON. 240 (1968) [hereinafter Dolbear]; J. Friedman, An Experimen-
tal Study of Cooperative Duopoly, 35 ECONOMETRICA 379 (1967); Friedman & Hoggatt,
An Experiment in Noncooperative Oligopoly, in RESEARCH IN EXPERIMENTAL ECONOM-
ics 1 (1980); Hoggart, Friedman, & Gill, Price Signaling in Experimental Oligopoly, 66
AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1976); Plott, Industrial Organization Theory & Experimental Eco-
nomics, 20 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1485 (1982).
34. See Dolbear, supra note 33, at 254-55.
35. See generally Plott, supra note 33, at 1513-15.
36. See Plott, supra note 33, at 1516-17.
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number of sellers in a market decreases, the market price increases.
A decrease in the number of sellers causes the market price to in-
crease because each firm acting independently or "noncooperatively"
maximizes its profits by decreasing output. The Cournot model is
"consistent" in the sense that each firm's conjecture about how its ri-
vals will respond to a change in its output is verified in equilibrium.37
Cournot behavior represents a compromise between (1) the static
Bertrand model in which firms compete on the basis of price, and
generally set price equal to marginal costs regardless of the number
of firms, and (2) dynamic oligopoly models. 38 Cournot behavior also
arises out of a Bertrand model in which firms first choose their plan
capacities and then compete on the basis of price. 39
As described in detail elsewhere,40 a standard can be derived based
on the Cournot model to evaluate the welfare effects of horizontal
mergers. This model has (1) a fixed level of cost-reducing capital in
the industry, and (2) asymmetric firm sizes that arise out of firms
holding different levels of this capital. The more capital a firm owns,
the lower are its marginal costs. A merger combines two firms' capi-
tal in much the same way as a multiplant firm combines the opera-
tions of its plants. That is, the merged firm operates the two firms as
"plants" and equates their marginal costs. Marginal costs are a linear
function of the quantity produced.
In this model, mergers have two opposing effects on welfare. First,
firms with different levels of capital will, in equilibrium, produce at
different levels of marginal cost. Consequently, a merger results in
coordination of production, which reduces costs. Second, the increase
in concentration increases price, which reduces consumer surplus. In
welfare-enhancing mergers, the former effect outweighs the latter.
The equation characterizing welfare-enhancing mergers can be re-
duced to an equation involving (1) the elasticity of demand [E],
(2) the percentage market shares sl and s2 of the merging firms, and
(3) the Herfindahl of the non-merging firms, where the percentage
37. See Daughety, Reconsidering Cournot: The Cournot Equilibrium is Consis-
tent, 16 RAND J. ECON. 368 (1985).
38. See generally Abreu, Pearce, & Stachetti, Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Im-
perfect Monitoring, 39 J. ECON. THEORY 251 (1986); Porter, Optimal Cartel Trigger
Price Strategies, 29 J. ECON. THEORY 313 (1983). A problem with dynamic oligopoly
models is that they predict more collusion than is observed. In full-information Ber-
trand models, with a five percent real discount rate and a three-day lag before punish-
ment, the threat of zero profits in perpetuity supports the monopoly price with 2493
firms.
39. See Kreps & Scheinkman, Quantity Precommitment & Bertrand Competition
Yield Cournot Outcomes, 14 BELL J. ECON. 326, 327 (1983).
40. See generally McAfee & Williams, supra note 30.
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market shares are denoted s3, s4 ..... The Herfindahl of the non-
merging firms is referred to as the "conditional Herfindahl" [HC]:
HC = 10,000 (3 2 + s42 + . . .)/(100 - sl -s2)1.
The basic results of the model are given in Figure 1. The vertical
axis shows the conditional Herfindahl, and the horizontal axis shows
the elasticity of demand. The numbers at the top and right margins
represent the maximum post-merger market shares that the merged
firm can have without reducing welfare. (In the small area labeled
"all," every merger should be allowed.)






0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 E 2.5
Figure 1. The conditional Herfindahl (H) is shown on the vertical axis. The de-
mand elasticity (E) is shown on the horizontal axis. The numbers at the top and right
margins represent the maximum post-merger market shares that the merged firm can
have and still increase welfare.
To illustrate the use of Figure 1 in evaluating the welfare effects of
a horizontal merger, consider the following example using a pre-
merger Herfindahl index of 1916: Firm 1-market share, 30%; Firm
2-market share, 20%; Firm 3-market share, 17%; Firm 4-market
share, 13%; Firm 5-market share, 10%; Firm 6-market share, 7%;
Firm 7-market share, 3%.
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Suppose Firm 5 proposes to merge with Firm 6. The resulting
change in the Herfindahl index according to the Guidelines would be
140. In this case, the conditional Herfindahl is 2565, i.e., [10,000 (.302
+ .202 + .172 + .132 + 32) / (100 - .10 - 7)2], and the sum of the mar-
ket shares of the merging firms is 17%. Start in Figure 1 by drawing
a horizontal line where the conditional Herfindahl equals 2565, i.e.,
just below the value of 2600 on the vertical axis. Suppose, first, that
the demand elasticity is 1.0, and draw a vertical line at that point.
These two lines intersect a little below the upward sloping line that
has a value of 15% (as shown on the right margin) for the maximum
post-merger market share that the merged firm can have without re-
ducing welfare. In this case, the merger should be challenged be-
cause the sum of the market shares of the merging firms exceeds
15%. On the other hand, if the demand elasticity were 0.5, then the
merger should be allowed because the relevant upward sloping line
corresponds to a maximum post-merger market share of 17.5% that
the merged firm can have without reducing welfare.
There are a total of twenty-one possible mergers in this example.
They all violate the Guidelines except for the merger of Firms 6 and
7. Of the twenty-one possible mergers, seventeen violate the stan-
dard in Figure 1. The remaining four mergers may or may not vio-
late the standard in Figure 1 depending on the demand elasticity:
(1) The merger of Firms 4 and 7 violates the standard in Figure 1
if the demand elasticity is greater than or equal to 0.8. Thus, if the
demand elasticity is less than 0.8, the Guidelines' standard prevents a
profitable, welfare-enhancing merger.
(2) The merger of Firms 5 and 6 violates the standard in Figure 1
if the demand elasticity is greater than or equal to 0.7.
(3) The merger of Firms 5 and 7 violates the standard in Figure 1
if the demand elasticity is greater than or equal to 1.1.
(4) The merger of Firms 6 and 7 violates the standard in Figure 1
if the demand elasticity is greater than or equal to 1.7. Thus, if the
demand elasticity is greater than or equal to 1.7, the Guidelines' stan-
dard allows a profitable, welfare-reducing merger.
In general, the Guidelines tend to allow profitable, welfare-reduc-
ing mergers when a firm whose market share is greater than average
acquires a small firm. The Guidelines tend to disallow profitable,
welfare-enhancing mergers when two roughly equal-sized firms
merge, and the sum of their pre-merger market shares is less than
average.
If pre-merger demand is sufficiently elastic (E > 2/3), then an up-
per bound on the merging firms' sum of shares for welfare-enhancing
mergers is HC / (1 + HC). Therefore, all mergers involving the larg-
est firm in the industry reduce welfare, as do mergers that involve at
1080
[Vol. 16: 1069, 1989] Merger Guidelines
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
least half the industry's capacity. Similarly, a merger that creates a
new largest firm reduces welfare.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The proposed model shows that the elasticity of demand and mar-
ket concentration should not be separated in a merger evaluation, as
they are under the current Guidelines. Since both factors are cur-
rently used in merger evaluations, the proposed standard is not sub-
stantially more complex.41 Indeed, the notions of Herfindahl indices
and elasticities of demand are familiar to antitrust attorneys, so the
proposed policy represents merely an alteration of the standard-not
a change in the information necessary to make the evaluations.
41. The standard should not be used to evaluate the welfare effects of horizontal
mergers in all markets. If firms in a market have a history of forming successful car-
tels, the noncooperative standard would not apply. Also, if an increase in the market
price would cause entry to occur in a short time (e.g., less than a year), then the model
would not apply since it assumes no entry. One shortcoming of the noncooperative
merger guidelines is that no "safe harbor" exists. That is, there is no Herfindahl level
below which all mergers are allowed. In the model, a merger of two firms in an indus-
try with 10,000 equal-sized firms reduces welfare. Obviously, some "safe harbor" is re-
quired for the noncooperative merger guidelines.
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